Introduction
Over the past half-century, hundreds of millions of people have moved from rural to urban areas, and the global urban population recently surpassed the rural population. With 95% of the world's recent urban growth, developing countries are driving this ongoing phenomenon (U.N., 2012). As the global urban population has increased, so too has the process of suburbanization; most metropolitan areas are expanding geographically more quickly than the population is growing (Angel et al., 2005 (Angel et al., , 2010 Liu et al., 2005) . Although developing-world cities are, on average, three times denser than cities in the developed world, densities have been declining by about 1.7% annually. Based on satellite imagery of 120 cities, Angel et al. (2005) estimated that this should correspond to a tripling in developing-world cities' urban footprints between 2000 and 2030. A more recent estimate, based on satellite imagery of over 3500 cities, projected a slower but still rapid increase in urban footprints, from 300,000 square kilometers in 2000 to 770,000 square kilometers by 2030 (Angel et al., 2011) . The authors found that total population, GDP per capita, fuel prices, and arable land per capita explained most of the variation in land consumption across cities. They concluded that these findings support the classical economic model of urban spatial structure developed and refined by Alonso (1964) , Mills (1967) , Muth (1969) , Wheaton (1976) , and Brueckner (1987) , among others. In short, global suburban expansion would seem to fit the trends observed and theories developed in the United States: higher incomes and lower transportation costs have led to increased land consumption as more households have opted for larger suburban homes on larger parcels.
Over the same time period, there has been tremendous growth in the global fleet of cars, trucks, and motorcycles. Sperling and Gordon (2009) predicted that motor-vehicle fleets would double over the next two decades. Households in developing-world cities, particularly in China, are driving this trend (Sperling and Clausen, 2002) . Between 1991 and 2003 , the number of cars per thousand people grew fivefold in China and doubled in India (Pucher et al., 2007) . In 2009, China surpassed the U.S. as the world's largest car market (The Guardian, 2010) . From 2009 to 2010, the total fleet of registered cars increased by 8.7% in Asia and 8.4% in Latin America, compared to 0.2% in the U.S. and 1.2% in Western Europe (WardsAuto, 2012) . Analyzing a cross-section of low-to-high-income cities and nations, Ingram and Liu (1999) found that higher incomes contributed to both urbanization and car ownership. As countries become wealthier, they also become more urbanized and more reliant on private cars. In 1980, Ingram and Liu's (1999) sample of developing-world cities revealed an average of 60 motor vehicles per thousand residents compared to 482 in highincome countries.
The geography of car ownership largely follows the geography of wealth. Across a wide variety of methodological approaches, and at the county, city, neighborhood, and household levels, higher income correlates with higher car ownership and use (for a diverse range of methodologies and units of analysis, see Ingram and Liu, 1999; Holtzclaw et al., 2002; Keller and Vance, 2013; Newman and Kenworthy, 2006; Potoglou and Kanaroglou, 2008) . At the correct unit of analysis-generally thought to be the household or individual-income is usually the strongest predictor of car ownership (for examples from a range of geographies and contexts, see Zhang, 2004; Bento et al., 2005; Dissanayake and Morikawa, 2010; Zegras, 2010) . Geography, of course, also influences car ownership. Some of the wealthiest cities in the world, like Zurich and New York, have high transit use and low car-ownership rates. Copenhagen, despite high household incomes, has managed to become a city of cyclists (Gössling, 2013) . In New York City, parking availability may be an even stronger predictor of vehicle ownership than income (Guo, 2013) . In general, households' car ownership and use are lower in dense, diverse, pedestrian-oriented neighborhoods with good access to transit (for a review, see Ewing and Cervero, 2010) . These geographic attributes are most common in older, central areas of cities.
Based on the existing literature, it is easy to assume that, along with rising incomes and decreasing car prices, suburbanization is driving the developing world's rapid increase in car ownership rates. Yet the average suburban expansion in a developing-world city bears little physical or socioeconomic resemblance to the typical U.S. suburb. Although there are many examples of high-income, gated, suburban communities, developing-world suburbs are generally poor and densely populated. Perhaps for this reason, many researchers working in these areas opt for terms like peri-urban, peripheral, or fringe development rather than suburban, a term which often evokes a particular image of developed-world affluence. Are suburbanization and car-ownership moving hand-inhand or just in the same direction? As incomes increase and household sizes shrink, how will households adjust where they live and whether they own a car? If suburbanization and car ownership are not closely tied in Mexico City-which is wealthier, more suburbanized, and more reliant on private cars than most developing-world cities-they likely are not closely tied in many similar, but poorer peer cities.
Suburbanization and car ownership in Mexico City
In 1950, most residents of metropolitan Mexico City (Zona Metropolitana del Valle de México) lived in the four boroughs of the central Federal District (INEGI, 2012a) . By 2010, more residents lived in each of four concentric urban rings, defined by Suárez-Lastra and Delgado Campos (2007a,b) , than in the urban center, which continued to grow throughout the 1950s and 1960s but began to lose population in the 1970s (Figs. 1 and 2 ). Early urban expansion followed the major commercial avenues of the city into the first and second urban rings. The most rapid growth of the 1960s and 1970s occurred in informal settlements in the northeast and east along the highway to Puebla. Nezahualcóyotl and Ecatepec, in particular, absorbed large shares of population growth, increasing from around 40,000 to 800,000 residents between 1960 and 1970. By the 1980s, population growth began to decline in the first and, to a lesser extent, second urban rings. Although average annual metropolitan growth rates dropped from 1.8% between 1990 and 2000 to 0.9% between 2000 and 2010, the third and fourth rings have continued to grow rapidly and are now absorbing nearly all metropolitan population growth.
Two forms of housing production have dominated peripheral, and thus metropolitan, housing production: informal housing and, more recently, large publicly subsidized and commercially built housing developments. Between 1950 and 1980, informal housing accounted for 65% of Mexico City's total metropolitan housing production (Dowall and Wilk, 1989) . Most of this new housing was built on communally owned farmland (ejidos), drained lakebeds, or peripheral lands at the foot of mountains or on other environmentally unstable land. Sometime during the first decade of the 21st century, the national annual production of commercially built homes surpassed that of informal housing (Monkkonen, 2011a,b) . Most were purchased with subsidized loans from Infonavit, a national housing provident fund that requires private-sector employers to pay 5% of salaried workers' wages into the fund. Between 1995 and 2005, public agencies funded 75% of all housing loans by value, and even more by volume, in Mexico. Infonavit accounted for 81% of these publicly financed loans (Monkkonen, 2011b) .
Suburbanization, combined with a decrease in the average number of people per housing unit since 1970 (Fig. 3) , has contributed to a rapid increase in urbanized land, which grew from 118 square kilometers in 1940 to 1658 square kilometers in 2000 (Ward, 1998; Angel et al., 2010) . Suárez Lastra and Delgado Campos (2007b) estimated that the metropolis would expand an additional 380-560 square kilometers by 2020, a projection that is four to seven times higher than projected population growth.
Despite the rapid increase in land consumption, most new peripheral developments consist of densely packed row houses that are 25-50 square meters in size. In Ixtapaluca and Tecámac, two of Mexico City's fastest growing peripheral municipalities, census tracts that consist primarily of developments built since 1990 had a mean population density of 204 per hectare in 2005. This was more than one-third higher than the metropolitan average of 145 people per hectare (Guerra, 2015) . Fig. 4 shows a typical floor plan of a new commercial housing unit built by SARE, one of Mexico's large commercial-housing builders. While new commercial developments tend to be more densely packed than surrounding informal housing (Guerra, 2015; Monkkonen, 2011c) , the houses are similarly sized. Residents build informal neighborhoods lot-by-lot over time, while developers build commercial housing developments rapidly in several phases.
The geography of car ownership in Mexico City
Mexico City's vehicle fleet also has grown more quickly than the population. In 1980, there were 124 cars and light-duty trucks per 1000 residents. By 2010, there were 267. Between 2000 and 2010, there were 1.7 new cars and light-duty trucks for each additional person in the metropolis, for a total increase of 2.4 million cars.
The total car fleet and the number of cars per thousand people grew most rapidly in the second and third urban rings (Table 1) . The vehicle fleet, however, remains centrally concentrated, with more than half of all cars registered in the urban center and first urban ring, where only a third of the population resides. Conversely, the fourth urban ring accounted for 27% of metropolitan population growth between 2000 and 2010, but only 6% of new cars. In 2010, there were 647 registered cars per 1000 people in the urban center compared to 135 in the fourth ring.
Despite a rapidly increasing fleet, 57% of households did not own a car in 2007 (INEGI, 2007) . Of those that did, 76.6% owned one car, 18.5% owned two cars, and 4.9% owned three or more cars. As expected, higher-income households are more likely to own and use cars (Table 2) . Contemporary car ownership rates match income spatially, with ownership highest in the slow-growing and wealthy western half of the city (Figs. 5 and 6). Nevertheless, car fleets and ownership rates are growing quickly-albeit from a low base-in some of the poorest and fastest-growing neighborhoods in the eastern and northeastern parts of the city. The number of registered cars and light-duty trucks grew nearly fivefold between 2000 and 2010 in the five poorest municipalities. While the poor, dense neighborhoods of the northern and eastern suburbs have the lowest vehicle ownership rates, they also represent the greatest source of potential future demand.
Measuring the relationship of income and household composition with geography and car ownership
Households' choice of where to live, whether to own a car, and how to travel are assumed to be linked. This linkage introduces bias into models that attempt to estimate a causal relationship between elements of the urban environment, housing type, car ownership, and travel behavior. A common approach to address this issue has been to model residential choices and travel behavior simultaneously (Anas, 1981; Ben-Akiva and Bowman, 1998; Bhat and Guo, 2007; Lerman, 1976; Pinjari et al., 2011; Salon, 2009; Walker and Li, 2006) . In an early example, Lerman (1976) jointly modeled the housing location, housing type, car ownership, and mode choice to work of 177 single-worker households in Washington, DC, with a multinomial logit. More recent studies have followed the same approach (Salon, 2009) or have developed a more complex set of simultaneously estimated equations (Bhat and Guo, 2007; Pinjari et al., 2011) . All estimate the choices as a function of some measures of neighborhood, housing, household attributes, and transportation supply.
Unlike the aforementioned studies, the objective of this analysis is not to measure what attributes of geography correlate with car ownership, rather it is to estimate the extent to which specific geographies associate with car ownership as a function of household attributes, particularly household income. This introduces additional challenges. Since a given household's attributes do not vary across alternatives, it is necessary to interact alternatives with household attributes to provide the variation with which to estimate a model. Car ownership does not present a problem, since there are generally only a small number of alternatives-for example, a household might have no cars, one car, two cars, or three-ormore cars-and separate coefficients may be estimated for all but one of the alternatives, which is fixed (generally the no-car alternative). Household location options, however, might be as numerous as the smallest available geographic unit, such as the block or census tract. Bhat and Guo's (2007) three thousand households were selected from 233 alternative traffic analysis zones in the Bay Area. The authors introduced household income into the estimation by interacting income quartiles with estimates of regional accessibility and commute times, and subtracting the median zonal income from a household's actual income. Salon (2009) estimated a model with possible locations in all of New York City's more than 2000 census tracts. To simplify the estimation, only ten alternatives were modeled for each household: the chosen one and nine randomly sampled alternatives. Income entered the location model in two ways. First, each zone's housing price (presumably average or median) was divided by a household's reported income. Second, separate residential-location coefficients were estimated for households with per-capita incomes above and below $25,000. Lerman (1976) does not describe the total number of census tracts from which households might choose, but the 177 households faced a total of 25,601 alternatives. The model treated income as part of a variable termed Z, which subtracts the housing, travel, and tax costs from household income for each alternative. In the three studies, the models provided information on what types of neighborhoods were likely to attract what kinds of households, rather than where the households were likely to locate based on income.
There are two principal alternatives to analyze the extent to which specific geographies associate with car ownership as a function of household attributes. One is to interact household attributes with geographic ones, as in the above studies, and then use sample enumeration to predict how changes in household composition or income are expected to influence location choice on a map or at some interpretable geographic aggregation, such as downtown, urban, inner-suburban, and outer-suburban. The other is to divide the city into a small number of interpretable geographies (again, such as downtown, urban, inner-suburban, and outer-suburban) and model the effects directly. I opt for the second approach for three principal reasons. First, it directly measures the relationship between income and household composition, suburbanization, and car ownership. Second, the results are easily reported and interpreted. A map or data-aggregation, based on performing a sample enumeration that uses household attributes interacted with neighborhood characteristics, would present something of a black box. Third, household attributes like size and income are convincingly exogenous to household location and car ownership.
As such, the model provides reasonable and causally interpretable answers to the question of how higher incomes and smaller household sizes correlate with suburbanization and car ownership. Despite the benefits of directness and interpretability, this modeling approach also has disadvantages. First, it requires the definition of fairly large and crude geographies; I choose five to cover a diverse metropolis of over 20 million inhabitants. Second, it provides no information on why or how particular geographies attract particular households. Housing prices, school quality, accessibility, and many other attributes influence settlement patterns. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study, I prefer the advantages of directness and interpretability to the disadvantages of geographic crudeness and de-emphasis of the location-specific features that drive where households choose to reside.
Model specification
In this analysis, each sample household faces fifteen discrete alternatives: whether to own no cars, one car, or two-or-more cars, and in which of five geographic areas to reside. I combine the choice of two-or-more cars into a single option because fewer than 2% of households owned three or more vehicles. The five geographies, presented in Section 2, include the urban center and four, roughly concentric, urban rings. The probability that a household chooses any one alternative is the estimated probability that the utility of that alternative is higher than the utility of the other nine alternatives. Based on Bhat and Pulugurta's (1998) finding that unordered response models (such as multinomial logit or probit) tend to outperform ordered response models (such as ordered logit or probit) of car-ownership, and the added complication of combining an ordered car-ownership model with an unordered residential location choice, I opt to treat car ownership as an unordered choice.
Due to unobserved correlations across the alternatives, a multinomial logit model likely violates the underlying assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives. For example, car-owning households probably vary in some systematic and unmeasured way, such as a preference for driving, across the five different urban rings. Similarly, many households living in the urban center likely share certain unobserved features with other central households that also influence household location choices, such as where household members were born, regardless of whether they own cars. In order to account for unobserved relationships across the alternatives, I use a mixed logit model with random error components (for a full description of the model and estimation procedure, see Train (2009) ). The estimated utility of each choice alternative for each household is:
where a j are alternative specific constants for the choice alternatives.
bX ij is the vector of estimated parameters multiplied by the column vectors of household attributes (household income, size, educational attainment, and composition).
c ijc are zero-centered, normally distributed random error components for car-owning households.
d ijr are zero-centered, normally distributed random error components for the four urban rings.
ij is the type-1 Gumbel-distributed random error term.
Random error components are simulated by taking 3000 quasirandom Halton draws from a zero-centered normal distribution using the Biogeme software package (Bierlaire, 2003 (Bierlaire, , 2009 ). Table 3 provides descriptive statistics about the fifteen choice alternatives and socioeconomic data considered for the model. Data come from the metropolitan area's 2007 household travel survey (INEGI, 2007) . The survey contains information on just over 50,000 households, including income, household size and composition, and geographic location at a resolution equivalent to a U.S. census tract, and 200,000 weekday trips, including the geographic location of origins and destinations, trip purpose, trip duration, trip time, out-of-pocket expenses, and mode of travel. Households that did not report income were dropped from the analysis. The excluded households were less likely to own a car, more likely to live in the urban center, and less likely to live in the first urban ring than the rest of the sample. A total of 42,913 households remained.
Data and sources
Most sample households reside in the first and second urban rings, with a sizable portion of the population living in the third ring as well. There is a notable under-sampling of households from the most remote municipalities of the fourth urban ring. A third of households own one car, and an additional 10% of households own two or more cars. Ownership rates are highest in the center and first urban ring and lowest in the fourth urban ring. Households earned an average of $937 monthly (in 2007 U.S. dollars). Median income is significantly lower at $558, and the distribution of household income has a long tail out to the maximum of Table 4 presents the results of the mixed logit model of car ownership and residential location. As expected, a household's probability of car ownership rises systematically with income. The dummy variable for whether a household has any members with a college/professional degree or higher weakens the observed correlation between income and car ownership, but improves the overall model fit and may serve as a proxy for social status. Households from better-educated social classes are more likely to own cars and less likely to use public transit than otherwise similar households from social classes with lower educational attainments. Educational attainment may also capture some of the effects of accumulated wealth exclusive of monthly income, potential future earnings, and inaccuracies in declared income. Income and educational attainment are both significantly correlated with where households choose to live. Wealthier, better-educated households prefer centrally located residences and disfavor more remote urban rings.
Model results
Household composition also correlates with residential location. Households with older, working-age members are less likely to live in the second, third, and fourth urban rings than in the center or first ring. Households with members who are 60 years old or older also prefer central living, as do smaller households, while households with children under 11 are most likely to live in the center or third and fourth urban rings. Larger, younger, and poorer households tend to locate in the periphery. Smaller, older, and wealthier households tend to prefer more central locations.
Despite the expected correlations, none of the random error components proved statistically significant. This indicates that the included covariates do a good job of capturing non-random variation in preferences across the available choices. Despite insignificance, the reported model includes random error components, due to the potential for non-random correlations across choices and to allow more flexible substitution patterns between choices when predicting the outcome of changes in income or household size.
The relationship between income and household size and household's car ownership and location decisions
How does the model predict that households will respond to changes in income or household size? Given non-linearity in the estimation procedures, directly estimating this relationship from the parameter estimates in Table 4 likely produces biased results (Train, 2009 ). Instead, Table 5 predicts the aggregate response of an across-the-board 10% increase in household income on car ownership and household location. Since individuals' household size cannot be reduced by 10%, Table 6 presents estimates of the aggregate response to a randomly selected 10% sample of households having one fewer household member.
The model predicts that a 10% increase in all households' income would tend to produce a 1.8% increase in households owning one car. The number of households with two-or-more cars rises more in lockstep with income with an 8.4% increase. Taken together (and assuming a constant average vehicle ownership of 2.3 for households with two-or-more cars), the model estimates an income elasticity of car ownership of 0.44. This is lower than elasticity estimates of the relationship between per-capita GDP and vehicle fleets, which tend to range between 1.0 and 2.0 (Button et al., 1993; Ingram and Liu, 1999; Dargay et al., 2007) . However, the estimation includes additional household controls, such as geographic location and educational attainment that are also correlated with income. Furthermore, per-capita GDP and household income do not perfectly correlate. In Mexico, inflation adjusted per-capita GDP increased by 20% between 1994 and 2007 (World In addition to increasing car ownership, the model predicts that rising incomes tend to increase the demand for housing in central locations, rather than in the periphery. Similarly, decreases in average household sizes are likely to correlate with increased housing demand in the urban center, offset by corresponding declines in the second, third, and fourth urban rings and marginal changes in the first and second rings. A decrease in one household member among a randomly selected 10% of households corresponds to a 2.4% decrease in average household size, indicating an elastic relationship (À1.13) between household size and demand for the urban center. If the smaller household size is due to fewer children, the correlation with central housing demand appears even stronger.
Discussion
Based on the analysis of households' joint residential-location and car-ownership decisions, rising suburbanization and car-ownership do not appear closely linked in Mexico City. More central locations in Mexico City tend to attract wealthier households, which are also more likely to own cars. The periphery, by contrast, tends to attract larger, younger, and poorer households. This corresponds with findings that peripherally located households are more likely to use transit and less likely to drive than centrally located ones (Guerra, 2014a,b) . While central areas of Mexico City have the best transit accessibility, they also tend to have the best car accessibility, whether to jobs, schools, or cultural amenities. As incomes increase, households opt not only for car ownership, but also more central residential locations. According to the model results, holding all else constant, a 10% increase in all households' incomes correlated with a 4%-to-5% increase in car ownership, and a 3%-to-4% increase in households living in the urban center and first urban ring, offset by declines in the second, third, and fourth urban rings.
The classical model of spatial structure (see Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969) predicts that wealthier households tend to prefer the center when the higher accessibility costs of the periphery outweigh the benefits of higher housing consumption. This almost certainly occurs to some degree in Mexico City where commutes are long and onerous. Although average travel speeds are faster in the periphery, most trips are longer. The average one-way commute by car in the third and fourth ring was 53 min, as opposed to 37 min in the urban center (INEGI, 2007) . Brueckner et al. (1999) provided an additional, probable explanation: the natural, historical, and modern amenities of the urban center attract wealthier residents.
Whatever the reason, Mexico City's suburbanization has not been driven by households seeking larger units in peripheral housing due to lower transportation costs allowed by cars and higher incomes. Instead, the results suggest that many current suburban households, given the opportunity, would much rather live in central locations. Most suburban households rely on transit, and the average one-way work commute by transit was 71 min and cost 9 pesos in the third and fourth rings, compared to 44 min and 4 pesos in the urban center (author's calculations using INEGI (2007) ).
Despite these preferences, urban expansion may well continue, even if households become wealthier. Housing supply is sticky, particularly in the short run. If demand for central housing increases but central housing production remains flat, higher prices likely would absorb demand. This is particularly likely without a change in the predominant contemporary housing typology: the small row house in massive, peripheral developments built by large commercial developers and sold with subsidized loans to low-to-moderate-income households. This development model is highly reliant on large tracts of open land, which primarily exist in the periphery.
While the extent of the shift remains to be seen, the peripheral housing production model may be changing in the wake of the global financial crisis. In recent years, many newly built homes have sat vacant, and Infonavit and other lenders have foreclosed on tens of thousands of homes per year (Juárez, 2013) . Units in the most peripheral developments are particularly vulnerable. Shortly after taking office, the administration of President Peña Nieto announced a shift in subsidized lending policies in favor of vertical construction in more central locations (La Crónica de Hoy, 2013) . With two of the largest publicly-traded Mexican home-builders failing to report earnings in 2013 and another experiencing the steepest drop in value of any highly-traded company on the Bloomberg World Index (Levin, 2013; Purnell, 2013) , commercial developers are also looking for a new housing production model. At the end of 2014, however, new housing production remained low.
Unlike the housing industry, the car industry is ready and able to meet growing demand for new vehicles. If the metropolitan demand for central housing is not met, the third and fourth urban rings are likely to continue to grow rapidly, as will car ownership and use. This has serious implications for pollution, congestion, and households' commute times and travel expenditures. Households in the third and fourth ring are less likely to own or drive a car than more centrally located households. However, once peripheral households opt to drive, they drive significantly longer distances on an average weekday than similar but more centrally located households (Guerra, 2014b) .
Conclusion
Neither car-ownership trends by geography nor the model of households' joint car-ownership and residential-location decisions suggest that car ownership and suburbanization are moving handin-hand in Mexico City. Instead, wealthier households tend to opt for central locations and car ownership. Poorer households tend to live further from the urban center and rely more heavily on transit. If a random household's income doubles, its members are around 44% more likely to get an additional car and 29% more likely to live in the urban center. Given the sticky nature of housing supply and the current model of peripheral housing production, aggregate responses to higher income are more difficult to predict, as they will almost certainly be offset by higher prices. Despite this uncertainty, the findings certainly do not parallel the postwar land-use and transportation trends of the U.S., nor support the theory that, as incomes increase, households opt to live in larger, suburban homes on larger suburban parcels. Mexico City's metropolitan residents are not flocking to the suburbs in their personal automobiles. Instead, the households that can afford cars also tend to afford central locations, leaving the less desirable periphery to less-well-off households who move into informal settlements or newly-built subsidized housing. Whereas automobile ownership and single-family homes characterized suburbanization in the U.S., crowded minibuses and densely populated neighborhoods are more characteristic of Mexico City's suburbanization.
Mexico City tends to be wealthier, more suburbanized, and more reliant on private cars than many other developing-world cities. If the rise of suburbanization and car ownership are not closely tied in Mexico City, they are likely not closely tied in many similar, but poorer peer cities. That said, the extent to which they are tied almost certainly depends on the relative accessibility and amenity of the central city and the suburbs. In terms of public policy, this suggests that planners should put a greater emphasis on transit and other alternatives to car travel when planning for suburban expansion in developing-world cities. It also reinforces that urban residents, including poorer ones, value central locations. While producing new infill housing is almost certainly more expensive and difficult than producing new housing on large peripheral tracts of land, the benefits to consumers (not to mention environmental or congestion-related benefits) are also higher. This is not to suggest that all new housing should be infill, but it does indicate that a subsidized housing program that provides more choices for consumers and produces a larger number of more centrally located units could create more benefits than a program strictly favoring peripheral development.
